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COMMENTS
GOVERNMENT RECOVERY: FEDERAL MEDICAL
CARE RECOVERY ACT, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act1 allows the gov-
ernment the right to reimbursement from negligent third par-
ties for the cost of medical care furnished to injured beneficiaries
at government expense. Since the FMCRA's inception in 1963,
the Act has been the government's most potent weapon for initi-
ating personal injury claims against third party tortfeasors.
Within the last decade, claims asserted against such parties by
the United States have risen tenfold.' The effectiveness of the
Act is best demonstrated by the millions of dollars recovered an-
nually under its provisions by governmental agencies.
However, the Recovery Act is not an all encompassing leg-
islative mandate to the government for personal injury claims
against any conceivable party. A significant restriction on the
government's use of the FMCRA is that actions can be directed
only at negligent third parties.4 Yet recovery from the liable
tortfeasor is but one source, albeit a major one, of potential re-
covery by the government for the free medical care it renders its
employees, dependents, and veterans.5 Accidents involving no
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-53 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as FMCRA].
2. Based on statistics provided by the Department of the Army, agency
collections under the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act for calendar year
1971 were as follows:
Army $2,388,877.79
Navy 2,348,954.67
Air Force 1,859,488.00
Veterans Administration 1,775,666.36
Health, Education, and Welfare 206,838.72
Total $8,579,825.54
The Army, as the agency with the largest dollar recovery, asserted 4,035 claims
with a dollar value of $4,057,245.71 and collected on 3,393 claims for a total of$2,388,877.79. This can be contrasted with the same agency's efforts in 1964
when 464 claims were asserted, 119 collected for a total of $37,714.39. Vol. 2,
No. 6 THE ARMY LAWYER 8 (1972) and Letter from Chief, Tort Branch, De-
partment of the Army on December 22, 1972, on file in the office of the
SANTA CLARA LAWYER.
3. See note 2, supra. Army recovery for calendar year 1972 was slightly
higher at $2,728,478.98, D.A. Pamphlet 27-50-3, THE AaMY LAWYER 18 (March
1973).
4. The FMCRA limits governmental recovery to "circumstances creating a
tort liability upon some third person" and only allows recovery from "said third
person." 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1970).
5. American forces personnel and their dependents are guaranteed free
medical care by 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-78 (Supp. 1, 1971). Other laws providing
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third party liability frequently occur during normal employment,
and single car accidents are not uncommon. Although the gov-
ernment in these situations is still obligated to render prompt
treatment to an injured beneficiary, the employer's workmen's
compensation carrier or the injured party's automobile insurer
may be primarily liable for the hospital treatment. Government
agencies, cognizant of the potential for reimbursement of med-
ical expenses, have extended actions beyond only negligent third
party suits into the realm of private insurance contracts and state
employment compensation laws. This often means that automo-
bile insurers, employment compensation carriers, and the govern-
ment will jockey for position in an attempt to avoid ultimate lia-
bility for payment of medical expenses. The following sections
will briefly summarize the present status of statutory recovery un-
der the FMCRA, and then will explore in greater detail other
sources available to the United States for reimbur ement of medi-
cal expenses and the theories and limitations surrounding these
actions.
I. PRESENT STATUS OF RECOVERY UNDER THE FMCRA
United States v. Standard Oil: Events Precipitating the Act
Although there was no statutory authority, the United States
experienced some limited success prior to 1944 in pursuing ad-
ministrative claims against third party tortfeasors for medical ex-
penses which the government incurred." In that year, the United
States brought suit against the Standard Oil Company of Califor-
nia to recover $123.45 in medical expenses which the govern-
ment had furnished when a Standard Oil truck negligently struck
a member of the military. The government asserted that the
common law action per quod consortium et servitium amisit,
which allocated a cause of action to a master for injury to his
servant, should be extended to include the United States as an em-
ployer.7 In a landmark decision, United States v. Standard Oil of
free medical care are 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-50 (1967) as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 8143
(Supp. 1972) (federal civilian employees); 38 U.S.C. §§ 610(a), 612 (1970)
(veterans); 42 U.S.C. 249 (1969) (American seamen); and 42 U.S.C. § 253(a)
(1970) (Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Public Health Service
Commissioned Corps).
6. Army Regulation 25-520 (1943) allowed recovery for the cost of medi-
cal care and transportation of injured military personnel, the compensation paid
to them during periods of disability, and damages to government property. The
regulation cited no legal authority as establishing the military's right to collect
these claims, even administratively. This collection procedure was retained un-
til the revision of Army Regulation 25-220 on Sept. 15, 1947, when collection
for medical and transportation costs of injured servicemen and the compensation
paid them during disability were deleted as cognizable claims.
7. For an excellent discussion of the four traditional theories used to justify
government recovery-assignment, quasi-contract, equitable subrogation, and per
1973]
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California,8 the Supreme Court rejected the government's claim
on the grounds that it could not create a new basis for suit with-
out statutory authority, noting:
Congress, not this Court or the other Federal Courts, is the cus-
todian of the national purse.. . . When Congress has
thought it necessary to take steps to prevent interference with
federal funds, property or relations, it has taken positive
actions to that end. We think it would have done so here, if
that had been its desire. This it still may do, if or when it
so wishes. (emphasis added)9
Despite the Court's suggestion in Standard Oil that legisla-
tion be enacted, Congress made no real attempt during the next
sixteen years to formulate a method for allowing the govern-
ment to recover the value of medical care furnished to persons
who had been injured by third party tortfeasors. 10 Finally, in
1960 the Comptroller General submitted a report to Congress in-
dicating that the lack of statutory authority prevented the govern-
ment from recovering several million dollars each year for the
cost of medical care furnished to government beneficiaries." In
this report, the Comptroller General recommended that Congress
fill the legal void which resulted in windfall savings either to tort-
feasors or to their insurance carriers at the expense of the fed-
eral treasury.12
As a consequence of the 1960 Comptroller General report,
Congress enacted the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act which
became effective January 1, 1963. As custodian of the national
purse, Congress provided that:
In any case in which the United States is authorized or required
by law to furnish hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care
and treatment . . . to a person who is injured . . . under
circumstances creating a tort liability . . . the United States
shall have a right to recover from said third person the rea-
sonable value of the care and treatment so furnished and
shall, as to this right be subrogated to any right or claim
quod servitum amisit, see Long, The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act: A
Case Study in the Creation of Federal Common Law, 18 VILLANOVA L. REV.
353, 357-62 (1973).
8. United States v. Standard Oil of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
9. Id. at 314-16.
10. During this period the Veterans Administration continued to recover
on the basis of assignments from the injured party. See Stanford v. Pabco Prod-
ucts Inc., 53 N.J. Super. 300, 147 A.2d 286 (App. Div. 1958); Higley v.
Schlessman, 292 P.2d 411 (Okla. 1956); Henry v. Lit. Bros., 193 Pa. Super. 543,
165 A.2d 406 (1960); and note 152, infra.
11. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNrrED STATES, REVIEW OF THE Gov-
ERNMENT'S RIGHTS AND PRAcrIcES CONCERNINo RECOVERY OF THE COST OF
HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL SERVICES IN NEGLIGENr THIRD PARTY CASES (1960).
12. Id. at 16.
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that the injured or diseased person . . . has against such
third person to the extent of the reasonable value of the care
and treatment so furnished or to be furnished. (emphasis
added)' 8
Essentially, FMCRA allows the government to recoup costs
incurred while providing hospitalization to an individual injured
by the tortious conduct of a third party. The right of the United
States accrues simultaneously with the injured party's right to re-
cover damages from the prospective defendant.'4 The United
States may intervene in the injured party's suit or may, within six
months of the completion of treatment, institute a separate suit
against the tortfeasor. 15 Recovery is allowed only if the injury or
disease results from circumstances creating a tort liability under
the law of the state where the injury occurs.' 6
Advantages Conferred on the Government by the FMCRA
Extensive litigation has been necessary to clarify the appli-
cation of the FMCRA.' 7 Generally, courts interpret the FMCRA
as legislation embodying a federal fiscal policy that is to be lib-
erally construed in favor of the government.'" United States v.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1970).
14. See 28 C.F.R. § 43.2 (1972) for the obligations of a federal bene-
ficiary receiving care and treatment to cooperate with the government in the
prosecution of related actions.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1970), Attorney General Regulations, 28
C.F.R. §§ 43.1-.4 (1969) outlines the procedural implementation of the govern-
ment's claim under the FMCRA. Once notified of a potential third party claim,
the government agency advises the injured party and his attorney of the govern-
ment's claim and requests that it be included as part of the patient's special
damages. Although the United States cannot pay counsel fees for the attorney's
services (5 U.S.C. § 3106 (Supp. II, 1965-66) ), the majority of the plaintiffs'
lawyers have cooperated in asserting the government's claim as the agency prom-
ises its assistance in producing official records and expert testimony. If the in-
jured party rejects the government's request, the agency negotiates directly with
the tortfeasor and, if necessary, refers the claim to the Department of Justice for
suit. For an overall analysis of the procedures used by various government
agencies see Long, Administration of the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act,
46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 253 (1971).
16. United States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11 (D.C. Va. 1967); United States
v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
17. For an overall analysis of the legislative history and application of the
FMCRA see Bernzweig, Public Law 87-693: An Analysis and Interpretation of
the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1257 (1964); Long,
The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act: A Case Study in the Creation of
Federal Common Law, 18 VILLANOVA L. REV. 353, 354-55 (1973); and Comment,
The Rights and Remedies of the United States under the Federal Medical Care
Recovery Act, 74 DICKINSON L. REV. 115 (1969).
18. See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.F. 289 (1971). The 6th Circuit in
United States v. York, 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968) expressed the accepted
view that when a specific interest and right has been conferred upon the United
States by statute, the remedies and procedures for enforcing the right should
not be so narrowly construed as to prevent the effectuation of the policy de-
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Greene"9 articulated the general proposition that the FMCRA
creates an independent right of the United States subject only to
substantive state laws which create the cause of action for tor-
tious conduct.2 0 This proposition has the effect of conferring on
the government an independent cause of action and freeing its
rights of enforcement 2' from conflicting and restrictive state laws
which would otherwise severely inhibit federal recovery. 2 A
number of advantages derive from the government's right to a
cause of action totally independent of the injured party:
1. The government need not obtain an assignment from
the injured party.28
clared by Congress. Accord, United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir.
1968).
19. 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967). See also United States v. Fort Ben-
ning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967).
20. The original statute proposed by the House Judiciary Committee states
that the United States would be subrogated to the rights of the injured party.
108 Cong. Rec. 6669 (1961). In response to a memorandum from the Comp-
troller General criticizing the proposal for failing to create an independent right(2 U.S.C. Cong. and Admin. News 2646 (1962) ), the House Judiciary amended
the statute to its present form and stated:
This amendment makes clear that the United States is granted a dis-
tinct right to recover its costs and that this right is to be effectuated
through a partial subrogation to any right which the injured or diseased
person may have to proceed against the negligent third party.
H.R. Rep. No. 1534, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962). See generally Comment,
The Rights and Remedies of the United States under the Federal Medical Care
Recovery Act, 74 DICKINSON L. REV. 115 (1969). However, one commentator
has consistently argued that the right of the United States is not independent but
is merely statutory subrogation. Groce, The Federal Medical Care Recovery
Act and Its Side Effects, 36 INS. COUNSEL J. 1259 (1969); Groce, Public Law
87-693; The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act-A Partial Dissent, 509 INS.
L.J. 337 (1965).
21. The three possible means of enforcement by the government are inter-
vention or joinder in the suit of the injured party, institution of an independent
action, or subrogation. 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (1970).
The government's right to subrogation is still hotly disputed. Long, supra
note 7, at 369-72, discusses five possible alternatives and concludes by agreeing
with the West Virginia court in Tolliver v. Shumate, 151 W. Va. 105, 150 S.E.2d
579 (1966) that:
The statute . . . not only confers upon the United States the right of
subrogation to any claim which the person receiving such care and
treatment may have . . . but it also creates an independent right in the
United States to recover . . . Id. at 109, 150 S.E.2d at 582.For views different from Tolliver, see United States v. Fort Benning Rifle & Pis-
tol Club, 387 F.2d 884, 887 (5th Cir. 1967); Groce, The Federal Medical Care
Recovery Act and Its Side Effects, 36 INS. COUNSEL J. 1259 (1969); and Com-
ment, The Rights and Remedies of the United States Under the Federal Medi-
cal Care Recovery Act, 74 DICKINSON L. REv. 115, 116-23 (1969).
22. See United States v. Thomas Jefferson Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1246 (D.C.
Va. 1970).
23. United States v. York, 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Bartholomew, 266 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Okla. 1967); United States v. Wittrock,
268 F. Supp. 325 (D.C. Pa. 1967); but see United States v. Ammons, 242 F.
Supp. 461 (D.C. Fla. 1965).
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2. A state statute of limitations does not defeat the federal
claim.
24
3. A release by the victim to the tortfeasor does not affect
the cause of action.25
4. A state rule against splitting the cause of action con-
stitutes no defense.26
5. The government need not notify the tortfeasor or his in-
sured of its third party claim.2 7
6. The various remedies of the Act provided to the govern-
ment are not mandatory but permissive.
28
7. The government's failure to intervene in the injured
party's suit does not bar a subsequent independent ac-
tion by the government. 29
8. The contributory negligence of persons other than the
tort victim is not a defense against the government's third
party action.30
9. The United States is not barred by state intrafamily im-
munity laws.31
24. United States v. Gera, 409 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v.
Fort Benning Rifle & Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967); United States
v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967). Moreover, a three year federal
statute of limitations has been enacted and held applicable to claims asserted by
the United States under the FMCRA. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (Supp. II, 1965-
66). But see United States v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 460 F.2d
17 (9th Cir. 1972).
25. United States v. Winter, 276 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United
States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967); United States v. Guinn, 259
F. Supp. 771 (D.C. N.J. 1966); United States v. Bartholomew, 266 F. Supp. 213
(W.D. Okla. 1967). The Bartholomew court decided that since a serviceman
is entitled to free medical care, no settlement or release obtained from such a
person can extinguish the government's interest in recovering the cost of medi-
cal care and treatment furnished by the United States. "Tortfeasors who at-
tempt to settle in this way do so at their peril." 266 F. Supp. at 215.
26. United States v. Nation, 299 F. Supp. 266 (D.C. Okla. 1966).
27. United States v. York, 398 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Bartholomew, 266 F. Supp. 213, 215 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
28. United States v. Housing Authority of Bremerton, 415 F.2d 239 (9th
Cir. 1969); Conley v. Maattala, 303 F. Supp. 484 (D.C. N.H. 1969); and
Palmer v. Sterling Drugs Inc., 343 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
29. United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968); United States
v. York, 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Thomas Jefferson Corp.,
309 F. Supp. 1246 (D.C. Va. 1970); United States v. Wittrock, 268 F. Supp. 325
(D.C. Pa. 1967).
30. See United States v. Housing Authority of Bremerton, 415 F.2d 239
(9th Cir. 1969); Cox v. Maddux, 255 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Ark. 1966) rev'd on
other grounds sub nom., Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967). But see
Nikiforow v. Rittenhouse, 319 F. Supp. 693 (D.C. Pa. 1971) where the primary
negligence of the Coast Guard and secondary acts of the injured party where
held to bar the United States.
31. United States v. Haynes, 445 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971) and United
States v. Moore, 469 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1972). The Third Circuit in the
Moore decision initially applied the Maine intrafamilial immunity law against
the United States in agreement with the lower court ruling, 311 F. Supp. 984
1973]
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Because these procedural advantages significantly amplify
the United States' right of recovery, the government seeks to bring
each personal injury suit within the auspices of the Act. How-
ever, the FMCRA's limitation to only third party tortfeasors pro-
hibits use of the Act in many instances. 2 The following dis-
cussion will explore the success of the United States in extend-
ing recovery attempts beyond the present limits of the FMCRA
into the areas of automobile insurance contracts and workmen's
compensation laws.
II. AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INSURANCE
Vehicular liability insurance indemnifies the insured against
loss sustained through payments made by reason of his legal i-
ability to a third person.8 3 Uninsured motorist and medical
payments coverage, on the other hand, requires payments to be
made directly to the injured insured. 4 Medical payments cov-
erage obligates the insurer to pay any expenses the insured in-
curs without any question of fault."' Uninsured motorist cov-
erage protects the insured against his inability to collect a valid
claim or judgment against an insolvent and uninsured motor-
ist. 6 As a general rule the coverage of an insurance policy
protects not only the named insured, but also the persons or
classes of persons specifically listed in the policy's omnibus
clause.87
Shortly after the passage of the FMCRA, Eli P. Bernz-
weig in his article, Public Law 87-693: An Analysis and Interpre-
tation of the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act,"s suggested
(M.D. Pa. 1970), that 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (a) (1970) mandated the application of
state law. Civil No. 19,070 (Apr. 27, 1972), rev'd on resubmission, 469 F.2d
788 (3d Cir. 1972). Upon review, the court relied on the Haynes decision,
that state law should not govern:
We are of the opinion that the Medical Care Recovery Act confers on
the United States an independent right of recovery which is unimpaired
by the vagaries of state family immunity laws. 469 F.2d at 790.
32. See, e.g., Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Co. v. Barnett, 445
F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Allstate Ins. Co., 306 F. Supp. 1214
(N.D. Fla. 1969).
33. See generally, R. LONG, THE LAW OF LrAnIuTy INSURANCE § 1.06 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as LONG].
34. See generally, G. COUCH, INSURANCE §H 45:619-45:657, 82.1:1 -82.1:
26 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as COUCH].
35. Id.
36. Id. at 48:82. Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1252 (1961).
37. The omnibus clause extends protection of the insurance policy beyond
the premium-paying insured to any person or persons within a defined group, see
text accompanying note 42 infra, and may be either within the policy or as a sep-
arate rider or endorsement attached thereto. See generally, 7 AM. JUR. 2d 420
Automobile Insurance §§ 109 et. seq. (1963).
38. 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1257 (1964). Bemzweig is an attorney with the
office of the General Counsel, Department of Health, Education and Labor.
[Vol. 13
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that the United States could have a claim under the FMCRA
against specific provisions of the injured party's automobile in-
surance contract. The insurance industry quickly pointed out
that the victim's insurance carrier is not representing a negli-
gent third party, and, therefore, is not within the scope of the
FMCRA39
Since the purpose of the Medical Care Recovery Act was to
fill the statutory void created by the Standard Oil decision, and
that case involved only recovery from a negligent tortfeasor,4°
the insurance industry's position is sound. However, the govern-
ment's initial success in utilizing the FMCRA, consonant with
the liberal interpretation recognized by the courts, has encour-
aged federal attorneys to attempt extending the Recovery Act,
particularly where the injured party has uninsured motorist or
medical payments coverage as part of his insurance contract. Al-
though the government has not been successful in applying the
FMCRA to these actions, other theories have emerged allowing
federal recovery. The following analysis of standard insurance
policies and representative court decisions will indicate the the-
ories used by the government and foreseeable problem areas for
federal recovery.
Uninsured Motorist Coverage-The Government as a "Person"
The standard uninsured motorist clause provides that the in-
surer will pay the insured the amount of damages to which he
is legally entitled and which he would have recovered from the
tortfeasor if the tortfeasoi were not financially irresponsible.
41
"Insured" is normally defined as:
(a) the named insured and any relative; (b) any other per-
His review of the FMCRA has been the most frequently cited article on govern-
ment recovery.
39. Groce, Public Law 87-693: The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act-
A Partial Dissent, 509 INS. L.J. 337 (1965). Groce's article was a rebuttal to
Bernzweig's analysis, and argued that the FMCRA only allows recovery from a
negligent third party and not the injured party's insurance carrier.
40. See text accompanying notes 7-9, supra.
41. LONG, § 24.02. All but four states (Maryland, North Dakota, New Jer-
sey, and Wyoming) have enacted statutes requiring that uninsured motorist cov-
erage be included in all automobile liability insurance policies. Of the four
states, only Wyoming has failed to establish an unsatisfied claim or judgment
fund in lieu of statutory requirements. The terms "uninsured motorist coverage,"
"family protection insurance," and "innocent victim coverage" are used inter-
changeably and denote this type of coverage. The purpose of this provision is to
close the gaps inherent in motor vehicle financial responsibility and compulsory
insurance legislation. It is intended, within the limits of liability, to afford
financial recompense to persons who receive injuries or the dependents of those
who are killed, solely through the negligence of motorists who, because they
are uninsured and not financially responsible, cannot be made to satisfy a judg-
ment. Id. at § 24.01.
1973]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER [Vol. 13
son while occupying an insured automobile; and (c) any
person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover be-
cause of bodily injury which this part applies sustained by
an insured under (a) or (b) above. (emphasis added) 42
The construction of this type of clause regarding govern-
mental recovery action has been crystallized to a great degree by
the decision in Government Employees Insurance Company v.
United States.4" In GEICO, a federal beneficiary was injured by
an uninsured motorist and the United States sought recovery from
the tort victim's insurer under the uninsured motorist provision
of the insurer's policy. The insurance company presented the
standard argument that the United States should be limited by
the FMCRA to recover only from third party tortfeasors and not
against the injured party's insurance carrier. The Fourth Cir-
cuit, however, looked beyond the limits of the FMCRA to the
terms of the insurance contract and held that the government
fell within the policy's definition of an insured "person." The
court noted that the government's cause of action only collaterally
depended on the FMCRA and "[u]ltimately . . . depends upon
the express terms of appellants' [GEICO] contract."44
Although the GEICO holding may seem a rather liberal
application of the FMCRA and a questionable intrusion into
the area of private insurance contracts,45 subsequent courts
have uniformly found the United States sufficiently within the
policy's definition of "insured" or "person" to qualify for re-
covery.4 The GEICO decision's significance is that it allowed
42. Family Automobile Policy, Government Employees Insurance Company,
Part I, Person's Insured, effective November, 1971.
43. 376 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1967) Government Employees Insurance Com-
pany [hereinafter referred to as GEICO] has been the insurance company most
frequently in litigation against the United States. Other major cases bearing
their names are at notes 64 (medical payments clause) and 75 (express exclusion
of the government in the insurance policy) infra.
44. Id. at 837.
45. Compare the federal cases allowing recovery to a recent analogous state
action, California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Jackson, 9 Cal.
3d 859, 512 P.2d 1201, 109 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1973), where a passenger in an in-
sured automobile was injured as a result of a collision with an uninsured
motorist. Medical expenses were paid by the California Department of Health
Care Services under their Medi-Cal program. The state agency then asserted
a statutory claim against the driver's insurer for reimbursement of Medi-Cal
outlays under the state mandated uninsured motorist coverage. The California
Supreme Court upheld the Medi-Cal claim and rejected the argument that the
lien statutes limited recovery to only third party tortfeasors. However, an
amendment to the state insurance code which the court alluded to, but which
was not effective until after the accident in question, apparently eliminates state
recovery by disallowing coverage where recovery would inure "directly to the
benefit of the United States, or any state or political subdivision thereof." CAL.
INS. CODE § 11580.2(c)(4) (West Supp. 1973).
46. United States v. Government Employees Insurance Corp., 440 F.2d
1338 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. United Services Automobile Assoc., 312
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the extension of government recovery actions beyond the ex-
press limits of the FMCRA. The question, as yet unanswered, is
whether the previously enumerated advantages of the Recovery
Act carry over into this primarily contractual recovery theory
which denominates the United States as "a person."
Contractual Recovery-Forfeiture of FMCRA Advantages?
The impact of contractual rather than statutory recovery is
best exemplified by the recent Ninth Circuit decision in United
States v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.4 7  In Hartford, a
military dependent was injured and subsequently treated at gov-
ernment expense. Sixteen months after the accident, the govern-
ment sued the injured party's insurer under the provisions of Hart-
ford's uninsured motorist clause claiming that it qualified as an
"insured" under the policy. The court agreed that the government's
claim under the contract was valid,4s but that such an action was
barred by the state's one year statute of limitations.49
Government writers have attacked this decision asserting
that it subjects governmental claims under the FMCRA to state
laws,50 thereby contravening two previous Court of Appeals
cases 51 which held that state statutes of limitations do not bar
the United States' independent cause of action arising under the
FMCRA. However, despite the apparently contradictory court
decisions, the decision is sound. The advantages available to the
government when acting pursuant to the FMCRA, such as
avoiding state statutes of limitations, are limited to the scope of
F. Supp. 1314 (D.C. Conn. 1970); United States v. Commercial Union Ins.
Group, 294 F. Supp. 768 (D.C. N.Y. 1969); United States v. Commercial
Union Insurance Group, 294 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
47. 460 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 979 (1972).
48. Id. at 18.
49. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(i) (West Supp. 1972). California is the
only state thus far that has passed a specific (one year) statute for these claims.
It provides that no cause of action shall accrue under uninsured motorist cover-
age within one year from the date of accident unless: "(1) suit for bodily in-
jury has been filed against the uninsured motorist, in a court of competent juris-
diction, or (2) an agreement as to the amount due under the policy has been
concluded, or (3) the insured has formally instituted arbitration proceedings."
It is interesting to note that in 1971 California added § 11580.2(k) requiring
that the insurer notify the insured 30 days before expiration of the statute of
limitations; failure to notify will toll the statute. Presumably, since the Hart-
ford decision allowed the United States to claim as a "person," the insurer will
be required to notify not only the policy holder but also the government when
applicable.
50. Letter from Chief of Tort Branch, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate,
Department of the Army, dated December 22, 1972, on file in the office of the
SANTA CLARA LAwYER.
51. United States v. Gera, 409 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v.
Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967).
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the Act. Therefore, contractual actions against the injured par-
ty's insurer rather than a third party tortfeasor should be sub-ject to normal state contract laws. Cases in other federal circuits 52
holding the United States immune from state statutes of limitations
when acting pursuant to the FMCRA are not applicable to the
Hartford situation. As was explained in GEICO, the right
of the government against private insurers is contractual and
therefore independent of the FMCRA.5 3  Since private contracts
are regulated by state law, and the government is claiming a con-
tractual right as a "person," the limitations of state laws apply. By
sounding its claim in contract rather than under the FMCRA,
the government may forfeit the procedural advantages which ac-
crue to it under the Act. Thus, when the government is proceeding
strictly within the parameters of the FMCRA, it appears to re-
tain its sovereign status and the federal law will almost invariably
prevail over conflicting state interpretations. Absent such express
authority in recovery actions outside the FMCRA, the govern-
ment may be relegated to the position of a private litigant and
bound by applicable state procedural laws, whether or not they
define, create, or extinguish the claim.
Medical Payment Coverage: Third Party Beneficiary Theory
The preceding discussion concerning uninsured motorist
provisions sets the stage for an analysis of the second source of
government recovery in the field of automobile insurance-med-
ical payments coverage. Medical insurance payments, unlike un-
insured motorist coverage, is completely non-fault and accrues
at the time of the accident regardless of liability. 4 The stand-
ard medical payments clause in an insurance contract obligates
52. Id.
53. 376 F.2d at 837. But see the recent California Supreme Court decision
that allowed a statutory rather than contractual recovery by a state agency
against the uninsured motorist coverage of an insured's policy. In Calif. State
Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Jackson, 9 Cal. 3d 589, - P.2d -, - Cal.Rptr. - (1973) the court reviewed the statutory language governing claims
which, similar to the FMCRA's prohibition, limited recovery to "the third
party who is liable for the injury" and rejected the argument that such language
denied recovery against an insurance company. "Recovery by the injured party
under uninsured motorist coverage," the court reasoned, "is a recovery from
the uninsured tortfeasor of damages for the bodily injuries negligently causedby the latter. . . . In short, the insurer's liability under uninsured motorist
coverage stands in the place of the third party tortfeasor's liability ....... 9
Cal. 3d at 867, - P.2d at-, - Cal. Rptr. at - (1973).
54. See generally, LONG §§ 8.01, 8.03. Medical expense coverage offered
under a liability insurance policy is usually purchased with liability coverage for
bodily injury. It affords payment for all reasonable expenses incurred within one
year of the date of accident. Unlike uninsured motorist provisions, such coverage
is optional; no financial responsibility law makes its purchase mandatory.
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the insurer to pay all the medical expenses "incurred"55 within one
year "to or for the named insured" or his relatives who sustain
bodily injuries resulting from an accident involving the insured's
car or one that he was driving.5 6 If the injury occurs within the
terms of the policy, the insurer is obligated to pay.57
Professor Joseph Long in his article, Government Recovery
Beyond the Federal Medical Recovery Act,58 set the stage for
current case law allowing the United States to recover under the
medical payments provision of an insurance contract. After
thoroughly analyzing the wording of such clauses, Professor Long
concluded that the government should be allowed to recover un-
der these express provisions as it was permitted recovery under
uninsured motorist clauses.59  However, recovery against the in-
55. The requirement that the injured party "incurred" expenses was the ma-
jor obstacle to government recovery prior to the widespread acceptance of the
third party beneficiary theory. The leading decision, United States v. St. Paul
Mercury Indemnity Co., 238 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1956), and its progeny de-
nied federal recovery under the contract on the basis that the insured could
not incur any expenses because he is entitled to free medical care at federal ex-
pense. See Note, Insurance-The Word Incurred as Used in the Medical Cov-
erage Clauses of Standard Automobile Insurance Policies does not Cover Antici-
pated Medical Costs, 20 DRAKE L. REv. 195 (1970); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 468
(1966); and MEYER, HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE LAW § 17.19 (1972).
56. Government Employees Insurance Company, Family Automobile Pol-
icy, Part II, Coverage C obligates the insurer:
To pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the date
of accident for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray and dental services,
including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, pro-
fessional nursing and funeral services:
Division 1. To or for the named insured and each relative who
sustains bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting
therefrom, hereinafter called "bodily injury", caused by accident,
(a) while occupying the owned automobile, (b) while occupying a
non-owned automobile, but only if such person has, or reasonably
believes he has, the permission of the owner to use the automobile
and the use is within the scope of such permission, or (c) through
being struck by an automobile or by a trailer of any type;
Division 2. To or for any other person who sustains bodily injury,
caused by accident, while occupying
(a) the owned automobile, while being used by the named insured,
by any resident of the same household or by any other person
with the permission of the named insured; or
(b) a non-owned automobile, if the bodily injury results from (1)
its operation or occupancy by the named insured or its opera-
tion on his behalf by his private chauffeur or domestic serv-
ant, or (2) its operation or occupancy by a relative, provided
it is a private passenger automobile or trailer,
but only if such operator or occupant has, or reasonably believes he
has, the permission of the owner to use the automobile and the use is
within the scope of such permission. (emphasis added)
57. COuCH, §§ 45:619-45:657.
58. 14 So. DAKOTA L. REv. 21 (1969). Professor Long is the leading au-
thority on the FMCRA. His other articles on the subject include Administra-
tion of the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 253
(1971) and The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act: A Case Study in the Crea-
tion of Federal Common Law, 18 VILLANOVA L. REV. 353 (1973).
59. Id. at 33-48. However, at the time of Long's article, government agen-
cies were not pursuing recovery in this area due to the FMCRA's limitation to
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sured's medical payments provision was not actually effectuated
until 1970 when the "third party beneficiary" theory was in-
troduced to circumvent the FMCRA.6 0
The third party beneficiary theory of recovery is predicated
on the express wording of the medical payments clause which ob-
ligates the insurer to "pay the injured person or any person or or-
ganization rendering the services."' This provision was con-
strued in both United States v. United Services Automobile As-
sociation6 2 and United States v. State Farm Mutual3 as authoriz-
ing the government to recover as a third party beneficiary for
medical services rendered by the United States to an insured's
dependent. The Fourth Circuit justified the theory in United States
v. Government Employees Insurance Company64 by noting:
[i]t must be assumed that the insurer knew that its insured
in this case was entitled to obtain medical services at the ex-
pense of the United States, as provided under Section 1074(b), 10 U.S.C. It had included as a separate part of its con-
tract of insurance, for which it unquestionably charged a por-
tion of its premium, this provision obligating itself to pay
the medical expenses incurred as a result of an accident on
behalf of the insured.65
only third party liability actions. For example, Army Regulation 27-38 (Sept. 29,
1967) made no mention of medical payments recovery. This regulation was super-
seded on 15 January 1969 with later amendments in March 1969 and April 1970.
A new regulation, AR 27-40, is due in late 1973 and includes "assertion of medical
care claims based on the Federal Claims Collection Act, State workmen's compen-
sation laws, State hospital lien laws, and control rights under terms of insurance
policies, as well as the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, are authorized."
DA Pamphlet 27-50-6, THE ARMY LAWYER 26-27 (June 1973).
60. United States v. United Services Automobile Association, 431 F.2d 735(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
61. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Coverage C, Divi-
sion 7 cited in United States v. State Farm, 455 F.2d 789, 790 (10th Cir. 1972).62. 431 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
63. 455 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1972).
64. 461 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1972).
65. Id. at 60. In response to the insurer's claim that a serviceman does
not "incur" expense as required by the contract clause, the court cited a govern-
ment commentator who argued that the serviceman's right to free medical care is
part of his pay. His medical expenses, therefore, are in effect prepaid, and pre-
payment is an "incurred" expense. Gotting, Recovery of Medical Expenses and
the Medical Care Recovery Act, 20 JAG 75, 77 (December, 1965-January,
1966). This reasoning is faulty as there is no correlation between private in-
surance obligations and required medical care. Free medical treatment provided
by statute, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-78 (1971), is not voluntary and, therefore, not
prepayment. Moreover, if Gotting is correct then the United States is a primary
insurer and subject to exclusion by contract liability provisions denying con-
tribution to primary insurers. See J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAC-
TcE, §§ 4911-14 (Supp. 1972). Better reasoning is suggested in American In-demnity Company v. Olesijuk, 353 S.W.2d 71 (Texas Civ. App. 1961); the
serviceman "incurs" costs when he is billed for treatment even though the gov-
ernment ultimately pays the expense.
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Therefore, the court reasoned that since a serviceman was en-
titled to free medical care and the insurer was aware of this fact,
both parties must have intended that the government be able to
recover any expenses incurred on the insured's behalf.
As in the case of uninsured motorist provisions, government
successes under the medical payments provisions have been
greatly assisted by liberal decisions. The FMCRA, although not
directly applicable, established the fiscal policy which has been
apparent in subsequent court decisions.
Express Exclusions in Insurance Policies
The preceding sections demonstrate that federal recovery
may be expanded beyond the limitations of the FMCRA by ap-
plying contract theory with the government assuming the role of
"a person" or "third party beneficiary" in insurance contracts.
The Hartford66 decision indicated that the procedural protection
afforded by the FMCRA may disappear when contractual
recoveries are being sought by the government. However, the
area of real vulnerability for the government lies in the possibil-
ity that insurance companies may expressly exclude the United
States in a policy.6 7 Since the government has been allowed to
recover under the insurance contract only by liberally interpreting
definitions of "person" and "organization," an express federal ex-
clusion could prohibit governmental actions.
The insurance industry has long been aware of the govern-
ment's vulnerability to policy wording and its writers have sug-
gested amending insurance policies to eliminate federal recov-
ery either by express exclusion of the United States or by a narrow
definition of parties covered by the contract."8 A Florida federal
66. See text accompanying notes 47-53, supra.
67. Another potential impairment for government recovery is the advent of
state and federal no fault insurance plans. The present administration's strong
support of no fault recovery (U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, March 12, 1973,
at 38-41) may ultimately lead to the passage of a federal no fault plan similar
to the Hart-Magnuson Bill, § 945, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) or amending 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (1972) to allow federal participation in state plans. Vol. 2,
No. 6 THE ARMY LAWYER 7-8 (1972). Either of these alternatives requires
compensation without fault up to some maximum amount. Eliminating any de-
termination of liability will certainly encumber government actions utilizing the
fault based FMCRA. However, the government is apparently willing to accept
the loss in cases falling below the threshold amount to insure passage of a na-
tional no fault plan. Letter from Chief, Tort Branch, Office of the Judge Advo-
cate General, December 22, 1972, copy on file in the office of the SANTA
CLARA LAWYER. In fact, there has been some suggestion that the FMCRA
might be an acceptable casualty in favor of a national plan. Id.
68. Dingfelder, The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act-Today, 550 INs.
L.J. 853, 863 (1968).
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court decision, United States v. Allstate Insurance Co.,69 illustrates
the impact on government recovery under a narrowly worded
contract provision. Allstate's policy limited medical payments
coverage to the "named insured and his relatives and residents
of his household, and other persons while in or upon, entering
into or alighting from the owned vehicle. ' 70  The court held that
the government did not fall within the limits of the contract and
could not recover from the otherwise liable insurer. The court's
interpretation that the government is excluded is not surprising,
but the decision is a clear suggestion to other companies of an ef-
fective way to eliminate claims by the United States.71
While Allstate only indirectly eliminated the government,
by narrowly defining the parties, Government Employees Insur-
ance Company attempted expressly to exclude federal recovery
by adding the following endorsement to their liability policy:
It is agreed that the policy does not apply under the Liabil-
ity Coverage for Bodily Injury or Property Damage to the fol-
lowing as insureds:
1. The United States of America or any of its Agencies.
2. Any person, including the named insured, if protection is
afforded such person under the provisions of the Federal
Tort Claims Act.72
Prior to the endorsement the GEICO policy contained the stand-
ard omnibus clause extending coverage to "anyone responsible
for the operation of the vehicle." 78  A Colorado federal district
court found this contract modification void for lack of consider-
ation and mutuality of assent.74  On appeal the Tenth Circuit 75
reversed the lower court, holding that the exclusion of the United
States as an omnibus insured was properly incorporated into the
renewal contract and characterized the government as a "third
party who is seeking a gratuitous benefit. '7 6
69. 306 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Fla. 1969).
70. Id. at 1215.
71. But see Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company v. Manchester
Insurance and Indemnity Company, 467 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1972) and notes
83 and 87 infra.
72. Government Employees Insurance Company v. United States, 400 F.2d
172, 175 (10th Cir. 1968).
73. Id. at 173. See also notes 89-90, infra.
74. Courtright v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 489 (D.C. Colo. 1967), rev'd
sub nom., Government Employees Insurance Company v. United States, 400 F.2d
172 (10th Cir. 1968). However, the lower court did concede that "[I]f the en-
dorsement [excluding the government as an insured] is valid [i.e., mutuality of
understanding between parties and adequate consideration], there can be no re-
covery by the United States." 276 F. Supp. at 492.
75. Government Employees Insurance Company v. United States, 400 F.2d
172 (10th Cir. 1968).
76. Id. at 175. But see United States v. Government Employees Insurance
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The impetus provided by the decisions regarding the Allstate
and GEICO policies has led to the next logical step, the exclusion
of the United States under medical payments coverage. Follow-
ing a 1971 decision holding the United States an intended bene-
ficiary under the medical payments provision of a GEICO pol-
icy, 7  GEICO issued the following amendment effective July,
1971:
This policy does not apply under part II [Expenses for Med-
ical Services] to: The United States of America or any of its
agencies as an insured, a third party beneficiary, or other-
wise.78
Since each of the decisions holding in favor of the government
under medical payments coverage specifically relied on the
express wording of the contract, 9 this exclusion completely
eliminated federal recovery. In 1972 a government branch re-
quested that the Department of Justice file suit against GEICO
for the medical payments exclusion. 80 The Justice Depart-
ment replied:
In view of the express endorsement excluding the United
States from coverage pursuant to the medical payment por-
tion of the policy we do not believe litigation is warranted.
The courts have held that exclusions as to the United States
are valid when contained in the liability portion of the policy.
Company, 461 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1972) where the court stated:
• . . the United States was not a volunteer; it, in rendering the service,
was discharging a statutory obligation, little different from the common-
law obligation of a parent to a minor child, and like the parent, it is
entitled to recover for its expenses incurred by reason of its statutory
obligation to the insured. 461 F.2d at 60.
This wording suggests the possibility of a quasi-contract recovery by the
government for services rendered. See notes 170-180 and accompanying text,
infra. If this restitution theory was accepted, an insurance company's express
exclusion of the United States in the policy would not be effective.
77. United States v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 330 F.
Supp. 1097 (E.D. N.C. 1971).
78. Family Automobile Policy Amendment, Government Employees Insur-
ance Company, Part II, Expenses for Medical Services, effective July, 1971.
United Services Automobile Association has also recently excluded the govern-
ment by stating:
Insurance afforded under Coverage C-1 of this endorsement to any per-
son designated under Division One of "Persons Insured" shall be re-
duced by any similar benefits paid or payable by any Government or
Government agency unless the insured is legally obligated to pay
therefore.
USAA Policy, Extended Medical, Death, and Disability Benefits, cited in Letter
from Pacific Claims Officer, United States Automobile Association, dated June
19, 1973, filed in the office of the SANTA CLARA LAWYER.
79. See text accompanying notes 42 and 61, supra. GEICO is now denying
all claims by the government against the medical payments clause of their
policies. Phone conversation June 10, 1973 with Senior Claims Representative,
Government Employees Insurance Company, California.
80. Vol. 3, No. 2 THE ARMY LAWYER 13 (February, 1973).
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We can perceive of no factor which would convince a court
that the medical payments clause cannot contain a valid ex-
clusion. 81
Although the decisions upholding the Allstate and GEICO
exclusions may support this rejection by the Justice Department,
the refusal to contest any exclusions is conceding too much.
'Any modification of an existing contract must meet contractual
,requirements of consideration and assent which may not bepresent in an exclusion amendment.8 2  Moreover, state laws gov-
erning insurance contracts have been used successfully to prohibit
unjustified exclusions of a normal omnibus insured. 3
One of the first states to experience mass requests by insur-
ance companies for contract modifications was Wyoming. 4  In
order to avoid the effect of the first medical payments decision 5
permitting the government to recover as a third party beneficiary,
'several insurance companies petitioned the Wyoming Insurance
Commission to amend their policies to specifically exclude the
United States. One company argued that the USAA decision "pro-
vides a windfall to the United States at the expense of the premium
paying policy holder and without benefit to him." 6  The Com-
missioner rejected each petition relying on a section of the Wyo-
ming Insurance Code which forbids "exceptions and conditions
81. Id.
82. See United States v. National Insurance Underwriters, 266 F. Supp. 636(D.C. Minn. 1967) where the contract defined "insured" as including any person
or organization legally responsible for use of the vehicle. The insurance com-pany attempted to exclude federal recovery by sending endorsements stating thatthe policy did not apply to the United States or any of its agencies. In consid-
ering the validity of the endorsement, the court ruled:
Where there has been no reduction in premium as consideration forthe "exclusion" clause that reduces the coverage contracted for in theoriginal policy, the said "exclusion" clause modifying the original pol-icy is invalid for lack of adequate consideration.Accord, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company v. United States,395 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1968); Engle v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 93 (W.D.Ark. 1966). But see Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1439 (1971) (Liability insurer's un-
conditional right to cancel policy) and 36 A.L.R. 2d 1018 (1954) (validity of
military exclusion clauses in life insurance contracts).
83. The leading decision in the area is Wildman v. Government EmployeesInsurance Company, 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 (1957) in which the Cal-ifornia Supreme Court held that the requirements of automobile liability insur-
ance coverage set out in the applicable Vehicle Code sections were to be in-
corporated into every automobile policy as a matter of law. Therefore, the in-
surer does not have the right to limit its coverage in a liability policy to a narrowdefinition of "insured" because such a limitation is contrary to public policy.84. Letter from Commissioner, Wyoming Insurance Commission, December
21, 1972, filed in the office of the SANTA CLARA LAWYER.85. United States v. United Services Automobile Association, 431 F.2d 735(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
86. Letter from Regional Director, United Services Automobile Associationto Commissioner, Wyoming Insurance Commission, November 1, 1971, filed in
the office of the SANTA CLARA LAWYER.
19731 GOVERNMENT RECOVERY
which deceptively affect the risk purported to be assumed in the
general coverage of the contract." 87
The denial by the Wyoming Commissioner is commendable
as it places the burden on the insurance companies to pay the cost
of medical treatment their insured receives regardless of the
source. Despite the decisions upholding the Allstate and GEICO
exclusions and the reluctance of the Justice Department to con-
test them, the Wyoming experience should induce other states to
also reject petitions for policy modification.88  To hold other-
wise would allow the insurer unilaterally to reduce coverage
without affecting the premium charge. If the insurance com-
pany expressly excludes the government as a claimant it should
then work a pro tanto reduction of the premium paid by the serv-
ice beneficiary vis 4 vis other insurance applicants.8" Moreover,
the strong wording of the most recent decision granting the gov-
ernment reimbursement from the medical payments clause of an
insurance contract indicates that some courts may look askance
87. WYOMING INSURANCE CODE § 26.1-316(b) (1967). See also ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 73, § 755(2) (Smith-Hurd 1965).
88. See Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company v. Manchester Insurance
and Indemnity Company, 467 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1972). The court upheld the
Illinois Insurance Director's decision that a liability policy endorsement restrict-
ing the definition of "insured" was unacceptable under state law that forbids
conditions which would unreasonably or deceptively affect risks purported to be
assumed by the policy. But see OREGON REv. STAT. §§ 743.800-.810 (1972)
which makes medical payments coverage mandatory in all automobile insurance
policies but excludes the government as a claimant unless expressly provided for.
89. Courts have uniformly rejected attempts by insurance companies to ex-
clude the government from a current policy without adequate consideration.
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. United States, 395 F.2d 176 (8th
Cir. 1968); United States v. National Ins. Underwriters, 266 F. Supp. 636 (D.C.
Minn. 1967); Engle v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 93 (W.D. Ark. 1966). In
Southern Farm the insurer issued an automobile policy, to a rural mail carrier
for a six month period with provisions for renewal at six month intervals. At
time of issue the policy contained the normal omnibus clause extending coverage
to anyone responsible for the operation of the vehicle. While the policy was in
effect, the insurer issued and transmitted an indorsement seeking to exclude the
United States from any coverage under the policy. In ruling on the indorsement,
the court noted that although the language of the amendment was clear and
unambiguous, at the time the indorsement was executed there was no reduction
in premium; neither was there evidence that the insurer intended to cancel the
policy if the indorsement was not accepted. The court concluded that the pol-
icy exclusion was not supported by adequate consideration and was therefore
void.
Unfortunately for the government, the decision upholding the GEICO ex-
clusion, note 75 supra, places a large loophole in the normal requirement of
consideration to modify a contract. The GEICO decision allowed the exclusion
when the contract was renewed, thus distinguishing the previous cases on the
grounds that the insurer's attempted modification had been to an existing con-
tract. Therefore, the insurance company need only wait until the current policy
lapses to eliminate the government as an omnibus insured or third party bene-
ficiary. Alternatively, the insurer need only rebate a reasonable portion of the
premium as consideration for the modification.
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at policies eliminating federal recovery without some considera-
tion flowing from insurer to insured:
To allow it [insurer] to eliminate from its obligation under
this provision, any expenses incurred by the United States
under the latter's statutory obligation to the insured would
mean that the insurer actually would have been incurring noliability, or at least a most limited one, under this part of
its policy. . . It would be unconscionable to so limitit.90
M-I. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Industrial compensation laws, unlike the FMCRA, stand on
the principal of liability without fault, whereby an employer is
assessed the compensable cost of job-connected injuries as a mat-
tei of social policy.91 Prior to these statutes, work-injured em-
ployees had little chance of success in court against such com-
mon law defenses as assumption of the risk, contributory negli-gence, and the fellow servant doctrine.92 Under employment
compensation statutes, the employee receives a guarantee for at
least partial recovery of wage loss, medical expenses, and restora-
90. United States v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 461 F.2d 58,60 (4th Cir. 1972). Even if the courts are not persuaded to allow insurance com-panies to expressly exclude the United States, the government may still be able to
recover a portion of its expenses. The Civilian Health and Medical Program of
the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-85 (1966), is a cost-
sharing health benefits program designed to reduce reliance on federal medicalfacilities by encouraging the use of participating civilian physicians and hospitals.An injured federal beneficiary may elect to receive civilian care for which hepays a deductible and 20-25% of the remainder of the costs, depending on his
status. Therefore, a government beneficiary may incur substantial civilian ex-penses in lieu of, or in addition to, federal treatment. Clearly the injured party
"incurs" expenses and the government suffers out of pocket loss, see note 55
supra. If there is medical payments coverage, the insurer will be obligated to
reimburse the government for both civilian and medical treatment. However,if the insured's policy contains an express government exclusion, then the UnitedStates should still be allowed to recover its payments to civilian hospitals. The
clause excluding the government, supra note 78, does not apply when the in-
sured is legally obligated to pay. Since the government beneficiary is obli-gated to pay civilian bills absent CHAMPUS reimbursement, the insured mustpay that portion of the expenses to the government. Claims representatives ofthe major insurance company excluding the government have accepted this ra-tionale and are paying the government its expenses attributable to civilian care.Phone conversation with Senior Claims Representative, Government Employees
Insurance Company, California, June 10, 1973.
91. HOROVITZ ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 7 (1944). See generally Lar-
son, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q.206-34 (1952); 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, c.l (2d ed. 1970).
92. 1 W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TExT § 1 (1960) [here-
inafter cited as SCHNEIDER] estimates that under the common law system,between 70 and 94 per cent of all labor casualties who sought to recover for
their physical losses received nothing.
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tive damages in exchange for the right to bring suit for full in-
demnification.98
The workmen's compensation area represents a potential
source of government reimbursement for expenses incurred by the
United States on behalf of federal beneficiaries injured during
non-government employment. Each time a military veteran,
dependent, or federal retiree receives treatment at federal expense
for injuries sustained in work covered by compensation laws, the
government loses money."4 Since the United States receives no
benefit when its beneficiary works for a private employer, the
government should not bear the burden of medical treatment
for work-related injuries.
Despite the obvious rationale for government recovery in
non-federal employment accidents, the United States has brought
few actions in this area." One major reason why federal
agencies have been reluctant to file workmen's compensation
claims is the lack of express recovery authority. Courts"6 and
commentators97 agree that the FMCRA's tortious conduct limi-
93. CHEIT, INJURY AND RECOVERY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT, 12
(1961).
94. There are two primary exceptions. The Veteran's Administration, 38
C.F.R. § 17.48(d)(2) (Supp. 1972) and the Bureau of Employees' Compensa-
tion, Department of Labor, 5 U.S.C. § 8131 (1970) have existing recovery pro-
grams whereby the injured employee assigns his claim to the government. See
notes 149-50, infra. For the right of city, Veteran, and charitable hospitals to
recover for services rendered although no actual charges were made directly to
the injured workman, see Stansburg v. National Automobile and Casualty Ins.
Co., 52 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 1951); Thrust v. Schlumberg Well Surveying
Corp., 131 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 1961); Kocko v. Harris Coal Co., 262 N.Y. 535,
188 N.E. 53 (1933); Trustees of State Hospital v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.,
71 Pa. Super. 545 (1919) in which the court said "it [free medical care] was
never intended for the relief of the employer and refusal to pay the hospital
would cast the expense directly on the state, instead of upon the employer
whose industry causes the injuries."
95. With the exception of cases brought under the assignment authority of
the Veteran's Administration, note 150 infra, there has been a paucity of re-
ported cases in this area. See Treasurer of the United States Army Service
Forces v. Atwell, 10 Cal. Comp. Cases 75 (1945) and Sickler v. Johnson, 10
Cal. Comp. Cases 216 (1945). Government attorneys have indicated that
workmen's compensation carriers are becoming increasingly willing to settle
cases rather than risk a major court decision, phone conversation with Recov-
ery Judge Advocate, Ford Ord, California, on December 19, 1972. More cases
should be expected in the future as the General Accounting Office has encouraged
the armed services to make special efforts in this area. Vol. 1, No. 4 THE
ARMY LAWYER 17 (1971).
96. See, e.g., National Mutual Casualty Company v. Barnett, 445 F.2d 573
(5th Cir. 1971) and United States v. Gusto Distributing Company, 329 F.
Supp. 578 (D.C. Mont. 1971).
97. Bailey, Hospital Claims-Problems in the Fringe Area, 7 A.F. JAG L.
REV. 7 (1965); Gotting, Recovery of Medical Expenses and the Medical Care
Recovery Act, 20 JAG J. 75 (1965); and Dingfelder, The Federal Medical Care
Recovery Act-Today, 550 INS. L.J. 853 (1968). Professor Long in Govern-
ment Recovery Beyond the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 14 So. DAKOTA
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tation makes that statute inapplicable to this area. However, this
does not mean, as one authority implies,98 that there can be no
recovery by the government. Enabling legislation, the Federal
Claims Collection Act,99 specifically allows heads of all govern-
mental agencies to "attempt collection of all claims of the United
States for money or property arising out of the activities of, or
referred to, his agency."' Although this legislation lacks the
specificity of the FMCRA, government attorneys have inter-
preted the statute as authority to pursue all claims where state law
creates a favorable cause of action.' 0' Federal claims are cogni-
zable, but the United States must approach compensation claims
as an ordinary lien claimant for services rendered. 02 The pro-
cedural advantages accruing to the United States under the
FMCRA103 are not applicable and the government must com-
ply with the laws of the jurisdiction to obtain reimbursement for
medical expenses. Federal agencies must be aware of specific
state requirements that can impede or eliminate federal recovery
and the procedural conditions for asserting a claim.
State Compensation Laws-Threshold Requirements
In order to consider workmen's compensation as a poten-
tial source of government recovery, certain general precepts must
be understood. Three basic threshold requirements must be satis-
fied before workmen's compensation laws apply.10 4  First, to be
eligible for benefits, an injured worker must satisfy the definition
of "employee" and his occupation must be "covered employ-
ment."'05 The question of whether or not a person is an "em-
L. REV. 20, 48 (1969) noted that cases involving employer or other employee
negligence will fall within the FMCRA although the defenses of assumption of
the risk and the fellow service doctrine may well bar federal recovery.
98. Gotting, Recovery of Medical Expenses and the Medical Care Recovery
Act, 20 JAG J. 75 (1965).
99. 31 U.S.C. §§ 951-53 (1966).
100. Id. § 952. The Act is limited to claims not exceeding $20,000.00 and
is general authority for federal agencies to attempt collection of any possible
claim.
101. Letters from Recovery Judge Advocate, Sixth United States Army,
Presidio of San Francisco, dated June 6, 1973, and from Chief, Tort Branch,
Office of the Judge Advocate General, dated July 13, 1973, filed in the office
of the SANTA CLARA LAWYER.
102. See CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 4600-05, 4903(b) and text accompanying
note 144, infra.
103. See text accompanying notes 23-31, supra.
104. See generally, LARSON, LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 50.40-
56.35 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LARSON] and HANNA, supra note 91, at c. 5.
105. SCHNEIDER §§ 279-658 and LARSON §§ 50.40-56.35. An exception to the
general coverage of workmen's compensation laws are the numerical exemp-
tions of about one-third of the states under which small employers are not cov-
ered by law. This numerical exemption ranges from two employees to 15.
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ployee" turns on the degree of control and direction the employer
has over the individual. Problems of definition arise for the gov-
ernment under such circumstances as when a serviceman is in-
volved in gratuitous on-the-job training in a civilian establish-
ment, or a federal dependent has part time unsupervised work. 106
Normally, "covered employment" includes all private and public
work a federal beneficiary may be involved in except agricultural
laborers, 10 7 casual workers, 108 and hazardous jobs. 109  Second,
the disability must be compensable in nature." 0  Most injuries
are covered by this definition; however, about one third of the
states have some limitation on recovery for diseases."' The
third requirement is that there be a causal link between job and
injury. Causation is usually expressed in the statute as an injury
"arising out of and in the course of employment" and is the
most difficult of the three conditions to meet.1 2  Once these ini-
tial conditions are satisfied, the injured employee is eligible for
employment compensation benefits, and payment is administered
according to the jurisdiction. Consider the following hypothetical
State Workmen's Compensation Laws: A Comparison of Major Provisions with
Recommended Standards, Bulletin Department of Labor (1971).
106. See, e.g., Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Arrien, 244
F. Supp. 110 (D.C.N.Y. 1965).
107. Farm workers are excluded from workmen's compensation benefits in
many states although the employers of such workers may elect to cover them.
See generally BLAIR, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 4:04 (1972) and
SCHNEIDER H8 626-78. This omission is likely to be corrected in the near future
due to extensive work by national and local unions.
108. Casual employment is irregular work of an impermanent nature. See
generally SCHNEIDER § 279-320 and Annot., 107 A.L.R. 934 (1937). A com-
mon example applicable to federal recovery is a government dependent working
part time as a domestic servant.
109. Fewer than a dozen states have workmen's compensation statutes which
limit their applicability to a list of "hazardous" or especially dangerous employ-
ments-that is, business, industries, occupations or activities inherently and con-
stantly risky. Ordinarily, the only trade, business, or activity which brings the
parties under a hazardous employment statute are those which are specifically
set out in the applicable state statute. See generally, LARSON § 55.10, SCHNEI-
DER H8 396-592.
110. See generally LARSON H§ 37.00-40.60; SCHNEIDER H§ 1240-1462 and
94 A.L.R. 584 (1935).
111. SCHNEIDER §§ 279-320 and HANNA, supra note 91, at c.12. See also Com-
ment, Workmen's Compensation-Diseases Arising Out of Employment-A
Problem of Proof, 2 PACIFIC L.J. 678 (1971).
112. The words "arising out of" refer to the causal relationship between
employment and injury, while the words "in the course of" have reference to
the time, place and circumstances of an accident. BLAIR, REFERENCE GUIDE TO
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION H8 9:00 et seq. and HoRovrrz ON WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION 83-181 (1944). The Pennsylvania case of Henry v. Lit Brothers,
165 A.2d 406 (Pa. 1960) illustrates the importance of the particular wording
to the government's claim. In Henry the employee-veteran was injured while
playing touch football on his lunch break. The employer denied payment and
the government subsequently furnished treatment. Later, the injury was found
to be "in the course of employment," and the lien of the United States allowed.
1973]
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which, although based on California procedures, is reasonably rep-
resentative of most other states."'
An operator feeding lumber into a circular saw cut his hand
on the revolving blade. He was sawing a small piece of wood,
pushing it by hand, instead of using a pusher stick. The accident
occurred when his attention was diverted for a moment by a fore-
man who called to him.1 1 4
The injured man received immediate medical attention and
later treatment from a physician designated by the employer's in-
surance carrier. The treating physician also sent a report to the
insurance carrier and to the employer, estimating the duration
of disability at three weeks. Twelve days after the employer's
first report of injury was submitted, the injured worker received
his first benefit check from the insurance carrier. 1 5
At this point, if the worker suffers no permanent disability,
and there is no disagreement about the adjustment of the claim
proposed by the insurance carrier, the administrative machinery
will have run its course. Otherwise, the injured employee may
submit an additional claim to a hearing officer. 1 Appeals from
decisions of the hearing officer are heard by a full tribunal, the
Industrial Accident Commission.1"
113. The hypothetical situation is summarized from a study by Professor
Cheit of the Institute of Industrial Relations in CnMrr, INJURY AND RECOVERY IN
THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 246 (1961). California procedure is detailed in
California Continuing Education of the Bar, How to Handle Workmen's Com-
pensation Cases (1962) and Bancroft, California: Some Procedural Aspects of
the State Act, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 378 (1952).
The following sections of this Comment will emphasize California law and
workmen's compensation cases as examples of procedures particularly applicable
to government liens.
114. This type of injury is an excellent illustration of workmen's compensa-
tion benefits as opposed to common law actions. Recovery would have been
denied to the employee at common law since he assumed the risk of the hazard-
ous employment (saw operator), was contributorily negligent (pushed the wood
by hand), and the accident was due to the actions of a fellow servant (foreman).
See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (4th ed. 1971).
115. California, as opposed to the national average of about one month from
the date of disability to date of first payment, pays the first payment in 90% of
all cases within 12 days of the receipt of the employer's first report of accident
(which must be filed within 5 days). E. CHEIT, INJURY AND RECOVERY IN THE
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT, 263 (1961).
116. Contested claims for benefits are heard initially by a hearing officer,
such as a referee, arbitrator, or commissioner, who acts as an agent for the ad-
ministrative tribunal created by statute to administer the provisions of the com-
pensation act. See generally BLAIR, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 17.00
et. seq. (1968).
117. In some states appeals taken from a hearing officer to an industrial
board, court or commission are limited to a determination of only those issues
properly raised at the hearing, as with appeals to courts. In others, the boards
may review the entire record, not only those portions by which the appellant
claims to have been aggrieved. BLAr, supra note 112, at § 17.00.
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The hypothetical illustrates workmen's compensation pro-
cedure in its most uncomplicated form. An employee suffers a
compensable disability arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment, receives immediate and satisfactory medical attention,
and is promptly paid. However, if the hypothetical employee is
treated in a government hospital, the entrance of the United States
as an additional claimant greatly complicates the compensa-
tion procedure. The following section will define the general
duty of employer and employee concerning employment injuries
and the particular state laws with which the government must be
concerned to preserve the federal lien.
Preserving the Government's Compensation Claim
Assuming the government beneficiary satisfies the threshold
requirements for compensation, the obligation of the employer
vis ti vis the employee is defined as follows: When the employer
has sufficient knowledge of an injury to be aware that medical
treatment is necessary, he has an affirmative and continuing
duty to supply prompt medical treatment in compliance with the
statutory prescription on choice of doctors.' 18 Should the em-
ployer fail to perform his duty adequately, an injured federal ben-
eficiary may make suitable independent arrangements at the
employer's expense, including government medical facilities. 119
However, to preserve the government's claim, the responsible
federal agency must comply with all applicable state proce-
dures, particularly laws pertaining to notice, choice of doctors,
and time limits for filing.
1. Notice to the Employer of Injury
To preserve a claim by the United States, the government
118. LASON § 61.12. See also Zeeb v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 67 Cal. 2d 496, 432 P.2d 361, 62 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1967) and Union Iron
Wks. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 190 Cal. 33, 39-40, 210 P. 410, 413 (1922);
Gallegos v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 273 Cal. App. 2d 569, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 157 (1969).
119. LARsoN § 61.12. The California Supreme Court clearly stated in
McCoy v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 64 Cal. 2d 82, 410 P.2d 362, 48 Cal. Rptr.
858 (1966) that:
.. . the employer should not, without good cause, be relieved of the
duty to furnish medical care. The duty of the employer to furnish
treatment in the first instance has been viewed strictly. It is settled
that the employee is entitled to reimbursement for self-procured care
when the employer has notice of the injury but fails to tender treatment
promptly (citations omitted). 64 Cal. 2d at 86, 410 P.2d at 365, 48
Cal. Rptr. at 861.
Accord, Stafford v. Pabco Products, Inc., 147 A.2d 286 (N.J. 1958) which held
that when the employer neglects or refuses treatment and the injured veteran
obtains treatment without charge from the government, the United States is
entitled to reimbursement.
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must ensure that the injured federal beneficiary complies with
the requirement of notice. 120 This condition is fundamental, as
it is necessary to allow the employer sufficient time to act within
his own resources before the employee elects independent medical
treatment at the employer's expense.' 21  Failure to insure proper
notification may bar the injured party's claim for expenses and,
ultimately, the government's lien.' 22  Once the employer receives
knowledge of the injury and fails or refuses to furnish the neces-
sary medical care, most states expressly allow the injured party
to procure privately the necessary assistance at the employer's
expense.' 23 Should an injured federal beneficiary select a gov-
ernment medical facility for treatment after the employer fails
to act, the subsequent rights of the United States as a lien claimant
are not firmly established. 124  However, since the primary party
has not fulfilled its legal obligation of adequate medical treat-
ment, a non-volunteer secondary source such as the government
should be reimbursed for incurred expenses.1 21
120. See generally, SCHNEDER §§ 2386-2438 and HANNA, note 91 supra,
at c.19(3).
121. The requirement for notice of the government's claim in workmen's
compensation should be contrasted with federal actions pursuant to the FMCRA
where the United States is not required to notify the tortfeasor or his insured of
its third party claim. See note 25, supra.
122. See, e.g., State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Luna, 156 Colo. 106, 397 P.2d 231(1964); U.S. Steel Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 115 Cal. App. 2d 862, 253
P.2d 45 (1953); Lunsford v. Clifford Bong, 27 Cal. Comp. Cases 302 (1962);
and Egenas v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 20 Cal. Comp. Cases 102 (1955).
123. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-15 (1959) and CAL. LABOR CODE
§ 4600 (West Supp. 1973). The New Jersey statute reads in part:
If the employer shall refuse or neglect to comply with the foregoing
provisions of this section the employee may secure such treatment and
services as may be necessary and as may come within the terms of this
section, and the employer shall be liable to pay therefor.
See also McCoy v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 64 Cal. 2d 82, 410 P.2d 362, 48
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1966).
124. Compare Stafford v. Pabco Products Inc., 147 A.2d 286 (N.J. 1958);
Pacific Employees Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 24 Cal. Comp. Cases 38(1959), with Highlands Insurance Co. v. Daniels, 410 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967) and Atkins v. DeBree, 24 App. Div. 2d 251, 265 N.Y.S.2d 307
(1965).
125. Government recovery as a non-volunteer secondary source is analogous
to cases allowing a State Employment Department recovery against workmen's
compensation carriers for the cost of unemployment payments made by the state
to the injured employee during the period of recovery. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 38 Cal. 2d 599, 241 P.2d 530 (1952); State Dept. of
Employment v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 227 Cal. App. 2d 532, 38 Cal. Rptr. 739
(1964). The California Appeals Board stated in McIntyre v. Excelsior Enter-
prises, 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 510 (1968), 'The medical expense is clearly the
liability of the employer or its carrier from which it should not be relieved by
the fact that applicant happened to receive reimbursement from another source."
33 Cal. Comp. Cases at 511.
In Marshall v. Rebert's Poultry Ranch, 150 S.E.2d 423 (1966), the em-
ployee-veteran suffered a job related injury but the employer failed to provide
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Even if the federal beneficiary has not given timely notice,
the government may still be able to assert a claim for medical
expenses. For a number of humanitarian reasons, workmen's
compensation statutes and court decisions provide various ave-
nues of relief for injured employees who do not comply with the
notice prerequisite. 2 ' A tardy notice, however, must be excused
before a hearing may proceed. 2 7  A common exception particu-
larly applicable to federal recovery is treatment rendered on an
emergency basis.' 28  Consequently, the government may have
a compensable claim when emergency care is given to a civilian
workman injured on a military post, as the notice requirement is
dispensed with in favor of prompt treatment.
2. Compliance with Statutory Choice of Doctor Rules
Even assuming that the government meets the initial notice
requirement, the United States may not have a cognizable claim
in jurisdictions with restrictive "choice of doctor" laws. 2' State
laws concerning employee selection of doctors vary from allow-
ing the injured employee absolute freedom in choosing a physi-
cian' 80 to restricting the option to doctors stipulated by the em-
medical attention after notice. The court upheld the government's claim, noting
that while the Congress intended to provide free medical treatment for indigent
servicemen it did not intend to relieve the employer of his statutory obligation
to provide medical treatment for his employees.
126. See generally, SCHNEIDER § 2355 et. seq. and LARSON H8 78.00 et. seq.
The majority of courts have been liberal in their interpretation of the notice
prerequisite and usually consider the following as adequate justification for honor-
ing a claim despite delay: 1) No prejudice to the employer or his insured,
2) mistake of fact regarding the seriousness of the injury, 3) actual knowledge
by the employer although no formal notification given, and 4) waiver of time
by employer or insurer. HOROWITZ ON WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATION § 247
(1944).
127. BLAIR, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 18.00 (1968). Brady-Ham-
ilton Stevedore Co. v. O'Leary, 238 F. Supp. 634 (D.C. Ore. 1964).
128. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-15 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1225 (1965);
and N.Y. WORK. CoMP. § 13(h) (McKinney Supp. 1973). Compare W.M.
Lyles Co. v. Work. Comp. Appeal Bd., 3 Cal. App. 3d 132, 82 Cal. Rptr. 891
(1969), with Sun. Indem. Co. of N.Y. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 85 Cal. App.
2d 171, 192 P.2d 765 (1948) in which the court denied recovery, holding that
initial emergency treatment does not justify long and extensive self-procured
medical care without notifying the responsible employer.
129. Most of the early workmen's compensation laws placed responsibility
for selecting the doctor upon the employer or the insurance carrier. The trend
in current legislation is toward selection of the physician by the injured worker.
The United States Department of Labor, Division of Workmen's Compensation
Standards, recommends initial selection of physician by the injured worker and
that process is presently allowed by statute in 22 states. State Workmen's
Compensation Laws: A Comparison of Major Provisions with Recommended
Standards, Bulletin Department of Labor (1971). See also CHEIT AND GORDON,
OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 39 (1963).
130. See, e.g., N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAWS § 13 (McKinney 1965). The re-
cent Texas statute abolishing that state's restrictive doctor selection require-
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ployer.18 1
In states allowing total freedom of choice, a government
medical facility is usually appropriate and gives rise to a compen-
sable federal claim for all services rendered. 8 2  However, Cali-
fornia and other states with narrow choice of doctor rules create
a serious obstacle in the path of federal recovery. Once the em-
ployer provides a satisfactory physician, it is very difficult for the
employee to elect government treatment subsequently at the em-
ployer's expense. Personal preferences 3' and dissatisfaction'
have been held insufficient justification to allow a change from the
company-provided doctor to another medical treatment source.
Despite the limitations imposed on government recovery by
narrow state "choice of doctor" laws, the United States may still
have a compensable claim under certain situations. Treatment ob-
tained on an emergency basis is normally an exception to the
general rule regarding employee selection of doctors.' 85 More-
over, an employer's consent to alternative medical care will bar
his subsequent objection and may be inferred from inaction.'3 6
A final possibility is for the injured employee to establish the in-
adequacy of the employer-provided treatment.3 7  Although the
ments should be a model for future legislation:
The employee shall have the sole right to select or choose the persons
or facilities to furnish medical aid, chiropractic services, and nursing
and the association shall be obliged for same or, alternatively, at the
employee's option, the association shall furnish such medical care,
hospital services, nursing, chiropractic services, and medicines as
may reasonably be required at the time of the injury and at any time
thereafter to cure and relieve from the effects naturally resulting from
the injury. TEXAS SEss. LAws ch. 88, § 73-10 (1973) amending TEXAS
ANN. ST. art. 8306 § 7.
131. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1973). The court in
Gallegos v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 273 Cal. App. 2d 569, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 157 (1969) described the purpose of this statute as "being to effect
prompt cure or relief with minimization of the danger of the employee's ob-
taining unnecessary and extravagant treatment at the employer's expense." 273
Cal. App. 2d at 573, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
132. But see Atkins v. DeBree, 24 App. Div. 2d 251, 265 N.Y.S.2d 307
(1965) and note 144, infra.
133. See LARSON § 61.12, nn.35-38 citing, inter alia, Pacific Indemnity
Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 220 Cal. App. 2d 327, 33 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1963)
in which the employer's compensation carrier offered a choice of three physi-
cians but the injured employee selected another physician. Reimbursement for
the self-procured treatment was denied. Accord, Montyk v. Workmen's Com-
pensation Appeal Bd., 245 Cal. App. 2d 334, 53 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1966); Burress
v. Work. Comp. Appeals Bd., 38 Cal. Comp. Cases 214 (1973).
134. Sun Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 85 Cal. App. 2d 171,
192 P.2d 765 (1948).
135. See note 124, supra.
136. See, e.g., Myers v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 191 Cal. 673, 679-80,
218 P. 11, 18 (1923).
137. McCoy v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 64 Cal. 2d 82, 48 Cal. Rptr. 858,
410 P.2d 362 (1966) and Draney v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 95 Cal. App. 2d
64, 212 P.2d 49 (1949). Some states impose additional penalties on an em-
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burden of proof for establishing unsatisfactory treatment is ri
gid, courts will tend to look more favorably on federal claims if
the employee's condition substantially improves while in the gov-
ernment facility. '388
One method for alleviating problems of government recovery
in states with restrictions on employee selection of medical treat-
ment would be for the United States to encourage employers to
identify federal facilities as permissible centers for employee
treatment. Since present federal rates are substantially lower than
comparable civilian prices for medical care,1"9 employers and
compensation carriers may well be amenable to such a suggestion.
Designating government hospitals as permissible sources would
simplify federal claims procedure and decrease employer costs
for medical services.
3. Timely Filing of Government Claims
An employer cannot, as a general rule, be held liable for
medical services rendered after the expiration of a statutory time
limit. 140 State limitations on the period of time allowed to file
claims for damages are designed to protect the employer from
stale claims. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the government
ployer who acts unreasonably in denying or inadequately providing medical
treatment to an injured employee. See HANNA, supra note 91, at § 17.06(1) and
General Motors Corp. v. Work. Comp. Appeals Bd., 37 Cal. Comp. Cases 817
(1973).
138. Cf. White v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 270 Cal. App. 2d 447,
75 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1969).
139. The government charges an all inclusive per diem rate for hospital care
regardless of the amount of treatment rendered. The present rate is $61.00 per
day for federal general and tuberculosis hospitals and $13.00 per day for out-
patient medical and dental treatment. 36 Fed. Reg. 11327 (1971). The Di-
rector, Bureau of the Budget, has authority to establish reasonable medical
charges pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11060, 3 C.F.R. 651 (1963). Since the
rates are established under authority delegated by Congress, they cannot be chal-
lenged. Tolliver v. Shumate, 151 W. Va. 105, 150 S.E.2d 579 (1966); United
States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11, 14 (E.D. Va. 1967). However, the defendant
may contest the necessity for the treatment. Id.
POSTSCRIPT: Director, Office of Budget and Management, has just an-
nounced that the rates of recovery for care rendered on or after July 1, 1973 are
$126.00 per day for inpatient treatment and $16.00 per visit for outpatient care.
38 C.F.R. 16806. This 100% increase makes government charges commensur-
able with civilian rates for normal treatment. The substantial raise in rates will
undoubtedly place even greater emphasis on all forms of federal recovery.
140. Compensation statutes provide for the filing of a claim for compensa-
tion with the proper authority, e.g., the Industrial Accident Board or the Work-
men's Compensation Board. Claims must be filed within the statutory period, usu-
ally one year. This is comparable to the statute of limitations in other types of
cases, and the failure by the claimant to assert a claim by filing the claim for
compensation with the proper authority within the proper time limit bars the
claim. See generally BLAIR, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 18.00 (1968),
Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 777 (1950) and Annot., 108 A.L.R. 316 (1937).
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to ensure that the injured party promptly files for medical services
provided at federal facilities.141  Most states allow only the em-
ployee or employer to file the action.1 42  In California, however,
Labor Code Section 5501148 allows the party in interest, his at-
torney, or any other representative authorized in writing, to file
a claimant's application. Since the applicant carries the burden
of proving a compensable case, it is probably a better policy for
the government to have the injured party file the action.
4. Lien Procedure
An example of a specific state lien procedure which includes
government compensation claims is outlined in California Labor
Code Section 4903.144 In California, medical care and hospitali-
zation furnished by the Veterans Administration or by a private
hospital to an injured employee are the proper subject of a lien.'4 5
Valid liens may attach to compensation paid pursuant to an award
to the Commission or paid voluntarily by the employer or its in-
surance carrier.146 New York, on the other hand, virtually elim-
inates federal recovery since hospitals supported by public taxa-
tion cannot provide treatment except under emergency condi-
tions.147  Other states make no particular statutory allowances
for private or government medical claims and, therefore, com-
mon law methods of recovery must be utilized. 14
Absent express Congressional authority, federal agencies
have attempted to establish a lien procedure by promulgating
agency regulations conditioning gratuitous medical care on sub-
141. Failure to meet time limitations will void the claim absent mitigating
circumstances. See generally Annot., 145 A.L.R. 1263 (1943).
142. See, e.g., Boyer v. Services Distrib., Inc., 366 Mich. 413, 115 N.W.2d
101 (1962).
143. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5501 (West Supp. 1973).
144. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4903 (West 1971). See also Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 287.140 (1965), which specifically provides that where treatment is rendered to
an injured workmen by a public hospital, payment therefor under the Workmen's
Compensation statute will be made to the appropriate public official.
145. Public Employees Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 24 Cal. Comp.
Cases 38 (1959).
146. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4903 (West 1971).
147. N.Y. WORK. CoMP. § 13(h) (McKinney 1965) limits recovery by hos-
pitals maintained by public taxation except for emergency treatment. Atkins v.
DeBree, 24 App. Div. 2d 251, 265 N.Y.S. 307 (1965) applied this statute to the
government and denied a Veteran's Administration claim for treatment rendered
to a veteran for an industrial accident.
148. See Higley v. Schlessman, 292 P.2d 411 (Okla. 1956) which held that
when the employer was on notice and failed to provide benefits, the Veterans
Administration was authorized to make a reasonable charge for medical treat-
ment to the same extent as any other private hospital or physician. See gener-
ally LARSON, supra note 101, at § 61.12.
1973] GOVERNMENT RECOVERY
rogation of the government to the injured employee's claim149 or
by requiring an assignment to the government.15 ° The Veterans
Administration has been the most successful in obtaining reim-
bursement,' 5 ' because its statute allows recovery from "['w]ork-
men's compensation' or 'employer liability' statutes, state or fed-
eral. .... "I2 Beyond internal agency regulations, no author-
ity is directly applicable to workmen's compensation as the
FMCRA is limited to actions against third party tortfeasors. The
lack of express authority for workmen's compensation recovery
is analogous to pre-FMCRA years where the government was
prohibited from demanding reimbursement from liable tortfeasors
in the absence of applicable legislation.'53 The few cases in this
area indicate the courts have adopted the pre-FMCRA philoso-
phy and narrowly examine government recovery suits.'
54
A recent Fifth Circuit decision illustrates the reluctance of
courts to allow government recovery beyond its express authority.
A military veteran sustained a compensable injury in the course
149. Federal Employees Liability Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et. seq. (1970) has a
provision subrogating the government to the claim of the injured employee
against responsible third parties. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8131-32 (1970). See also, Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1970)
and Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 351-53 (1970).
150. The Veterans Administration has a specific recovery statute for com-
pensation claims in 38 C.F.R. § 17.48(d) (Supp. 1964):
Persons . . . who it is believed may be entitled to hospital care or
medical or surgical treatment or to reimbursement for all or part of the
cost therefor by reason of any one or more of the following:
(1)(iii) 'Workmen's Compensation' or 'employment liability' statutes,
State or Federal;
(2) . ..will not be furnished hospital care, medical or surgical treat-
ment, without charge therefor to the extent of the amount for which
such parties, referred to in subparagraph (1) . . . will become liable.
Such patients will be requested to execute an appropriate assignment.
151. Marshall v. Rebert's Poultry Ranch & Egg Sales, 268 N.C. 223, 150
S.E.2d 423 (1966); Brauer v. White Concrete Co., 233 Iowa 1033, 115 N.W.2d
202 (1962); Stafford v. Pabco Products, Inc., 53 N.J. Super. 300, 147 A.2d 286
(App. Div. 1958); Higley v. Schlessman, 292 P.2d 411 (Okla. 1956); Henry v.
Lit. Bros., 193 Pa. Super. 543, 165 A.2d 406 (1960).
152. 38 C.F.R. 17.48(d) (1964). Professor Long, supra note 7, explains
this section as an extension of an earlier ruling by the Solicitor of the Veterans
Administration that a veteran cannot claim to be unable to defray the costs of
medical treatment when he is entitled to have the care paid for by some third
party. Veterans Administration Solicitor's Opinion No. 74-53, referred to in
Drearr v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 119 So. 2d 149, 150 (La. App. 1960).
The authority for this regulation is drawn from 38 U.S.C. § 621 (1964)
which authorizes the Administrator to prescribe rules and regulations governing
the furnishing of care and any limitations thereon. But see United States v.
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 238 F.2d 594, 598 which criticizes the assign-
ment provision as lacking adequate authority.
153. See text accompanying notes 6-12, supra.
154. See National Mutual Casualty Company v. Barnett, 445 F.2d 573 (5th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Gusto Distributing Co., 329 F. Supp. 578 (D.C.
Mont. 1971); Highlands Insurance Co. v. Daniel, 410 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967).
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
of his employment as a painter. As a veteran without means of
procuring medical treatment, he was entitled to free medical care
in a Veterans Administration hospital.1 Upon completion of
the treatment, the government asserted a demand for reimburse-
ment against the employer's compensation carrier for the value
of hospitalization rendered by the federal facility. The state In-
dustrial Accident Board and federal district court held for the gov-
ernment150 despite the government's failure to obtain the re-
quired assignment from their injured beneficiary. 157  The Court
of Appeals reversed the lower court in Pennsylvania National
Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Barnett,158 holding that the absence
of express federal authority and the government's failure to pro-
cure the required assignment prohibited recovery. Moreover, the
court cited the pre-FMCRA case of United States v. Standard
Oil"' for the proposition that the federal courts could not rely on
state law for government claims of reimbursement. 10
Barnett is particularly important to the government since
the Fifth Circuit has in the past treated federal uninsured motor-
ist and medical payment insurance claims liberally.' The warn-
ing to the government is clear: the fiscal policy underlying the
promulgation of the FMCRA may be liberally extended to acci-
dent insurance suits, but in workmen's compensation the United
States will be limited to its express authority. The Barnett de-
cision effectively narrows government recovery against work-
men's compensation carriers in federal courts to Veterans Admin-
istration (VA) hospitals which fulfill all conditions precedent
to securing a compensable lien as well as obtain an assign-
ment. 6
2
If Barnett is followed in other jurisdictions, employers and
their compensation carriers will receive a windfall gain each time
an employee receives government treatment, despite the employ-
er's primary liability, when suit is brought in a federal court or in
155. 38 U.S.C. §§ 601-43 (1970).
156. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 445 F.2d
573, 574 (5th Cir. 1971).
157. 38 C.F.R. 17.48(d) (1970).
158. 445 F.2d 573 (5thCir. 1971).
159. 332 U.S. 301 (1947). See text accompanying notes 6-9, supra.
160. See also Highlands Insurance Co. v. Daniel, 410 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967) holding that the FMCRA had not preempted the provisions of the
Texas Workmen's Compensation statute, and United States v. Harleysville Mutual
Casualty Co., 150 F. Supp. 326 (D. Md. 1957).
161. United States v. United Services Automobile Association, 231 F.2d 735
(5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 440 F.2d
1338 (5th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying notes 61-4, supra.
162. However, the Federal Claims Collection Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 951-53 (1966),
gives a federal agency a compensable lien any time a cause of action is created
by state law.
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a state whose narrow lien procedure prohibits recovery by the
United States. Perhaps the loss of money to the United States
Treasury resulting from Barnett will encourage Congress to pro-
vide for federal recovery in this area, just as the Standard Oil de-
cision contributed to the passage of the FMCRA. 168
Workmen's Compensation Recovery-An Alternate Method
The preceding discussion emphasizes the different state laws
that must be complied with to preserve a government compen-
sation claim. Even obviously cognizable claims are encumbered
by procedural roadblocks inhibiting recovery by the United States.
The ultimate result is a windfall to the employer who would have
to pay for the employee's medical care but for laws requiring the
government to treat federal beneficiaries without charge. This
unwarranted benefit is reminiscent of the pre-FMCRA era when
third party tortfeasors were immune from suit.'64  Although the
FMCRA is not applicable to workmen's compensation statutes, the
spirit of that fiscal legislation should control cases in which the
government provides medical care but another party is primarily
responsible.
Amending the FMCRA to cover both automobile insurance
and workmen's compensation claims is, of course, one solution.' 65
However, courts also have the ability to carry out goals of Con-
gress without requiring specific enabling legislation.' 16  Certainly
public policy is in favor of shifting the burden of employment in-
jury from public funds and taxpayers at large to the appropriate
private employer. In this regard, industrial compensation laws
are analogous to a growing field of consumer protection, products
liability. Products liability theoretically accomplishes by judi-
cial edict a form of strict liability similar to that which legislatures
have promulgated by compulsory compensation statutes. 6 7 Un-
163. See text accompanying notes 6-12, supra.
164. See notes and accompanying text 6-13, supra.
165. Amending the FMCRA may occur if a national no-fault insurance plan
is passed, supra note 67. Congress could take that opportunity to include
automobile insurance and workmen's compensation as sources for federal recovery.
166. Textile Worker's Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) estab-
lished the proposition that federal courts can create federal common law in
areas where Congress has initially acted. For an overall analysis of the Lincoln
Mills doctrine see Judge Friendly's article, In Praise of Erie-And the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383 (1964). An excellent example
of a decision in this area is the recent California Supreme Court decision, which
held that the statutory lien language limiting claims to only third party tort-
feasors was not intended to prohibit recovery from insurance companies in un-
insured motorist cases. Calif. State Auto Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Jackson,
note 53, supra.
167. See generally W. Paossmn, THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 96-104 (4th ed.
1971).
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derlying both products liability and workmen's compensation is
the theory that "the cost of the product should bear the blood of
the workman."' 68  This sound social policy should not evapo-
rate when the government is the financially injured party. Once
again the burden should be on the superior risk bearer, the party
best able to control and prevent the accident.16 9 Since the United
States is not in a position to prevent private employment injuries,
the burden of all medical treatment should be on the employer in
order to encourage the elimination of hazardous conditions.
However, despite the justification for government recovery under
workmen's compensation, the existing contractual and statu-
tory requirements will continue to present procedural roadblocks
which will impede or even eliminate federal reimbursement. A
possible solution exists in the application of the restitutionary
methods of implied-in-law or quasi-contract recovery.
When one person confers a benefit upon another without dona-
tive intent, the recipient of the benefit may be required to make
restitution of the benefit or its value to avoid being unjustly en-
riched. 170 A common example is the physician who renders
emergency treatment in an automobile accident. Since the doc-
tor is neither an intermeddler nor a mere volunteer, he may re-
cover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of his serv-
ices.171 Similarly, the United States should be reimbursed for the
treatment rendered by federal hospitals when the injured party
is covered by workmen's compensation. Government hospitals
do not volunteer their services nor is their treatment rendered
officiously. Indeed, treatment is obligated by law and given only
under certain specified conditions. 1 72  Therefore, the United
States should be reimbursed for its expenses just as the doctor is
allowed quasi-contractual recovery for his or her emergency treat-
ment.
Although the government may have an action in quasi-con-
tract for restitution, several unique defenses to this type of re-
covery would appear on their face to bar federal compensa-
tion.' 73  A close examination of the defenses, however, will indi-
cate that the government's cause of action survives. The "gift
principal"'174 eliminates quasi-contractual compensation when the
person who confers the gift does so without expectation of pay-
168. Id. at § 80.
169. See generally, C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS c. ix § 4 (1953).
170. D. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.2 (1973). See also A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 19 (1952).
171. J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 10 at 35 (1971).
172. See note 5, supra.
173. D. DOBBS, THE LAw OF REMEDIES § 4.9 (1973).
174. Id.
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ment. Since Congress has mandated free medical care, the treat-
ment would appear to be a gratuitous offering by the United
States. However, other statutes make it clear that the govern-
ment's free care should not be interpreted as a gift. The Fed-
eral Claims Collection Act is an all encompassing legislative au-
thority for recovery by federal agencies in any situation where a
cause of action is created by state law.175 Moreover, if third party
negligence is involved, the FMCRA entitles the government to
reimbursement regardless of state compensation laws.176 There-
fore, the United States does not have a donative intent in rendering
free care but does so with an expectation of repayment from
sources other than the injured party. The second defense, the
"choice principle,"'177 requires that the recipient of the benefit
have an opportunity to reject the benefit. Arguably, the United
States does not allow an employer freedom of choice when it pro-
vides medical care in a federal facility. On the other hand, em-
ployers hiring servicemen should be on actual or constructive
notice of the laws of the United States, including the military mem-
ber's right to free treatment. Hiring a government beneficiary
should be treated as a waiver by the employer of any subsequent
right to refuse government treatment on behalf of his or her em-
ployee.
At least one decision, a pre-FMCRA California compensa-
tion case, has adopted the quasi-contract theory suggested by this
comment as an alternate approach. In Sickler v. Fraser & Johnson
Co., 178 a navy Seabee was injured while working for the de-
fendant company on a four day leave. After treating the injured
serviceman the government asserted a claim for medical services
against the employer. Sickler & Johnson Co. denied the claim con-
tending that it stood ready and willing to furnish any necessary
medical care but was never afforded an opportunity to do so by
the military. The Commissioner rejected this contention and
found that the employer had impliedly agreed to reimburse the
government for medical expenses when it hired the serviceman. 7 a
175. 31 U.S.C. §§ 951-53 (1966). See notes 99-100, supra, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(25) (1968) which is a federal requirement that a state or agency ad-
ministering a medical assistance plan must, as a condition of approval, "...
take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third parties to
pay for care and services ... and (C) that in any case where such legal liability
is found to exist after medical assistance has been made available on behalf of
the individual, the State or local agency will seek reimbursement for such as-
sistance to the extent of such legal liability."
176. See notes and accompanying text 23-31, supra.
177. See DOBBS, supra note 173, at § 4.9.
178. 10 Cal. Comp. Cases 216 (1945).
179. Id. See also Treasurer of the U.S. Army Service Forces v. Atwell,
10 Cal. Comp. Cases 75 (1945) holding that the United States was entitled to a
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Although the Sickler decision may have little precedential effect,8 0
the conclusion is sound. To hold otherwise would result in an
abrogation of employer responsibility in many instances. As ex-
pressed by a North Carolina court on the issue of whether a fed-
eral hospital could recover against an employer for a veteran's
treatment:
This [free medical care to veterans] provision was made
in consideration of the veteran's previous service to his coun-
try. It does not, and was not intended to relieve an em-
ployer of his statutory duty to provide medical treatment for
his injured employees.' 8 '
Sickler's underlying rationale has obvious merit since the employer
should be liable for employee treatment regardless of the source
of care. State laws should be complied with by the govern-
ment when pursuing compensation claims, but if the federal lien
is not recognized by local law, then quasi-contract recovery
may be utilized.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act remains the principal
method by which the United States may recover from negligent
third parties the reasonable cost of medical care rendered to fed-
eral beneficiaries. Courts and commentators have stressed the
independent nature of the FMCRA and have viewed government
recovery attempts against tortfeasors liberally. Results have been
laudatory, preventing unwarranted gains to third parties at the
expense of taxpayers at large.
The limitation of the FMCRA to recovery only in cases in-
volving third party liability has not obviated governmental ac-
tions in other areas. Automobile insurance and workmen's com-
pensation are two alternative sources which the government
has utilized for recovery of medical expenses. However, future
federal recovery appears endangered by insurance companies'
contract revisions and detailed state compensation laws. Exclud-
ing the government as an insured "person" under the applicable
lien against the amount to be paid as compensation to a soldier who was injured
during free time while employed in private industry.
180. United States v. Standard Oil of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947) was de-
cided two years later and eliminated federal recovery against tortfeasors without
explicit Congressional authority. However, the FMCRA was enacted in response
to the Standard Oil decision and indicates the intent of the legislature to insure
maximum recovery. Moreover, the success of the United States in the medical
payments and uninsured motorist insurance cases, supra notes 46, 62-4, suggests
that courts are now looking beyond the limitations set by the Standard Oil decision.
181. Marshall v. Rebert's Poultry Ranch and Egg Sales, 268 N.C. 223, 225,
268 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1966).
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insurance policy may effectively eliminate federal recovery in all
automobile accidents where there is not a solvent tortfeasor.
Moreover, detailed employment compensation laws make gov-
ernment attempts to file as a lien claimant burdensome or virtu-
ally impossible.
The party legally responsible for an accident should bear the
subsequent cost of related medical treatment. In the absence of
a liable third party, the insurer-whether private or workmen's
compensation-is duty bound to pay medical expenses. The ex-
istence of laws allowing gratuitous treatment at government ex-
pense for certain federal beneficiaries should not eradicate the more
primary responsibility of the insurer/employer. It is uncon-
scionable to burden taxpayers at large for injuries that would be
compensated from private sources but for federal medical treat-
ment provisions.
The underlying intent of the FMCRA to prevent windfall
gains to tortfeasors and their insurance companies will be cir-
cumvented if the government cannot recover against the primary
insurer. Although the FMCRA is not directly applicable to re-
covery against other than third party tortfeasors, courts should
closely examine attempts to avoid or eliminate reimbursing the
United States in light of the FMCRA rationale. Finally, consid-
eration should be given to amending the FMCRA to clarify the
Congressional attitude toward government recovery efforts in all
possible areas.
John Charles Cruden
1973]
